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Current network data rates have made it increasingly difficult for cyber security specialists to pro-
tect the information stored on private systems. Greater throughput not only allows for higher
productivity, but also creates a “larger” security hole that may allow numerous malicious applica-
tions (e.g. bots) to enter a private network. Software-based intrusion detection/prevention systems
are not fast enough for the massive amounts of traffic found on 1 Gb/s and 10 Gb/s networks to
be fully effective. Consequently, businesses accept more risk and are forced to make a conscious
trade-off between threat and performance.
A solution that can handle a much broader view of large-scale, high-speed systems will allow us
to increase maximum throughput and network productivity. This paper describes a novel method
of solving this problem by joining a pre-existing signature-based intrusion prevention system with
an anomaly-based botnet detection algorithm in a hybrid hardware/software implementation.
Our contributions include the addition of an anomaly detection engine to a pre-existing sig-
nature detection engine in hardware. This hybrid system is capable of processing full-duplex 10
Gb/s traffic in real-time with no packet loss. The behavior-based algorithm and user interface
are customizable. This research has also led to improvements of the vendor supplied signal and
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Current network data rates have made it increasingly difficult to enforce cyber security policies.
Greater throughput not only allows for higher productivity, but also creates a “larger” security hole
that can allow numerous malicious applications (e.g. bots) to enter a private network. Software-
based Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) usually reside on endpoints and lack visibility of the
entire network because they are not fast enough for the massive amounts of traffic found on 1 Gb/s
and 10 Gb/s links. Consequently, businesses accept more risk and are forced to make a conscious
trade-off between threat and performance.
For these reasons and many more a solution is required that can handle a much broader view
of the network (i.e. more traffic without dropping packets). This will allow for an increase in max-
imum throughput and business productivity. Aside from human efforts, we propose that the next
best method for monitoring network traffic is a hardware-based implementation. Network security
devices that have been completely implemented in hardware are able to bypass the processor and
bus arbitration of shared local resources with which software implementations must contend. In
this paper it is shown that botnet detection for 10 Gb/s networks can be much more efficiently and
effectively done in hardware than in software.
Our contributions include the addition of an anomaly detection engine to a pre-existing signa-
ture detection engine in hardware. This hybrid system is capable of processing full-duplex 10 Gb/s
traffic in real-time with no packet loss. The behavior-based algorithm and Textual User Interface
(TUI) are customizable. This research has also led to improvements of the vendor supplied signal
and Application Programming Interface (API) specifications which we have made readily available
in Appendices A, B, C, and D of this report.
1.1 Motivation
MetaNetworks Technologies Inc. [20], recently acquired by Force10 Networks Inc. (F10) [17],
built an IPS system now known as the Force10 P-Series (F10P), which uses the Snort [33] rule-
based security language. The F10P can filter traffic up to the necessary 1 Gb/s and 10 Gb/s speeds,
however, there is no anomaly-based detection mechanism available in either model.
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The author’s current employer, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) [8], owns the 10 Gb/s ver-
sion of the F10P.1 In section 2.4 we will discuss the added benefits of having a hybrid implemen-
tation that can filter traffic based on pattern recognition and behavioral analysis. This paper will
describe the addition of anomaly-based detection to this system and the practical applications for
this device in evolving corporate networks where bandwidth is increasing by orders of magnitude.
Additionally, since the author is attending college under a Sandia sponsored National Physical
Science Consortium (NPSC) [7] fellowship, this project was required to benefit at least one of
Sandia’s many areas of research while still fulfilling the requirements for his degree. With an
educational background in both computer engineering and computer science, the author took the
opportunity to work with the F10P knowing that it would be a good blend of both curricula.
1.2 Botnets
Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (ID/PS) are meant to protect a private network from unau-
thorized access. Network security professionals must contend with various outsider and insider
threats every day. Attackers commonly use special programs (e.g. worms, viruses, trojans) to ex-
ploit a security hole in a computer system and breach corporate firewalls. This malware may carry
programs referred to as “bots” that are used to assist in attacks.
A “botnet” is a collection of bots, each of which run on a different victim’s machine without
their knowledge or consent. Because of their increased versatility, bots are a growing threat to
the internet while virus outbreaks have become less common. Cyber criminals are now often
motivated by financial gain rather than destruction. See articles [2, 11, 13–16, 21, 22, 26, 32] for
more information on the evolving threat of botnets.
Botnets are maintained by “bot herders” and managed through a Command and Control Inter-
face (CCI). Many bots are written in very well-structured and object-oriented code making them
extremely easy to customize. The CCI is utilized either by the bot herder or by a client that has
paid for the services that the botnet can provide. These services include:
• Spam - junk e-mail and, even more specifically, phishing e-mails have accounted for billions
of dollars lost to banks and clearing houses each year [30].
• Click Fraud - an attacker may use a bot to automatically click online advertisements for
their own financial gain.
• Identity Theft - bots may be used to collect and send personal information, including pass-
words and account numbers, back to the bot-herder via key logging, traffic sniffing, etc..
• Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks - DDoS attacks are easily generated with a
botnet. Bandwidth and local resource consumption can cause loss of connectivity/services
and cost businesses substantial sums of money.
• Distributed Processing - an attacker may use a victim’s local computational resources to
process data that would otherwise take a single computer weeks or even years to complete
(e.g. decryption of classified data). The SETI@home [1] and Folding@home [34] processing
model operates in a very similar manner but they are both used for constructive research
purposes rather than malicious exploitation.
1A 1 Gb/s (P1) or 10 Gb/s (P10) version of the F10P is available.
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Figure 1.1 from McAfee [29] illustrates the most common method for the creation and utiliza-
tion of bots.
1. Bot herder runs remote exploit scanner.
2. Scanner finds unpatched host which becomes victim.2
3. Victim machine requests bot software from file server (e.g. AgoBot, Sdbot, rxBot).
4. Bot binary is downloaded to victim and executed.
5. Bot reports back to the operator through command and control center (e.g. an Internet Relay
Chat (IRC) server).
6. Bot operator sends commands to bot on victim machine.
7. Bot operator controls all victim machines through one common interface (e.g. CCI).
Figure 1.1: Botnet Creation and Usage





Intrusion detection/prevention systems are used to protect a company’s private network. These sys-
tems help to prevent data theft and aid in automating cyber security processes. Intrusion detection
systems can alert system administrators to unauthorized accesses or other anomalous activities.
These devices are usually attached to router/switch monitor ports that mirror inbound (i.e. toward
the user’s private network) and/or outbound (i.e. toward the internet) traffic from all ports to one
common interface. The major disadvantage to this configuration is that the sum throughput from
all connected devices cannot be greater than the maximum throughput of the single monitor port.
Intrusion prevention systems are more intelligent than detection-only systems in that they take
a more proactive approach to traffic monitoring. Not only will these devices alert on certain events,
but they will also prevent the malicious traffic from ever entering the user’s internal network by
blocking the packets. In order for the packet blocking mechanism to function properly, these de-
vices usually have to be inline with a main network trunk or backbone. The major disadvantage to
this configuration is that if the intrusion system fails either physically (i.e. power loss) or logically
(i.e. false positives) it could prevent necessary traffic from reaching its intended destination.
2.1 Force10 P-Series Overview
The basic design of the Force10 P-Series (10 Gb/s) (P10) IPS consists of two Field Programmable
Gate Arrays (FPGAs) and a Complex Programmable Logic Device (CPLD) (see Figure 2.1). The
Xilinx® Virtex™-II Pro 50 (XC2VP50) is the pre-processor to the bi-directional traffic flows while
the Xilinx® Virtex™-II Pro 70 (XC2VP70) contains the user-defined IPS Snort policies.1,2
The Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) packets enter the first Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA) from the fiber optics [25] through the Media Dependent Interface (MDI), the 10 Gb/s At-
tachment Unit Interface (XAUI) core [12, 23], and a 10 Gb/s Media Access Controller (XGMAC)
core [24]. While the MDI is external to the FPGAs the XAUI and XGMAC cores are instantiated
inside the XC2VP50.
1The Snort policies/rules may be updated through any shell console via a pre-provided script.
2The pre-processor firmware for the XC2VP50 must be uploaded through a physical Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) port on
the card.
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Each XAUI operates at 156.25 MHz and internally generates 64 bits of Single Data Rate (SDR)
data per clock cycle while externally forwarding 32 bits of Double Data Rate (DDR) data per clock
cycle all resulting in a 10 Gb/s flow. The Xilinx XAUI cores contain 4 RocketIO™ transceiver
modules, each with a TX/RX lane running at 3.125 Gb/s. Before the first FPGA can pre-process
the packets, each RocketIO module fans out the serial data it receives from the fiber optic interface
into a parallel structure using a Serializer De-Serializer (SERDES). Once the XAUI internal core
receives the incoming traffic from all 4 RocketIO modules, it synchronizes and deskews [23] the
incoming parallel data into single 32-bit DDR words which it sends to the XGMAC. For a visual
representation of the 10 Gb/s interface structure refer to Appendix D.
The XGMAC core contains a 10 Gb/s Media Independent Interface (XGMII) module running
at DDR to create a single 64-bit word from the incoming 32-bit data before forwarding it to the
XGMAC’s internal core. After proper data reconciliation and flow control [24], the XGMAC
ultimately sends the data to F10 proprietary logic blocks within the XC2VP50. In addition, prior
to sending each 64-bit data word to the second FPGA, the F10P logic aligns each ethernet frame
chunk on byte zero while shifting in an additional 64 bits of incoming data in order to produce
128-bit words. Doubling the word size (i.e. taking two 64-bit chunks from each RX channel at
one time) allows the subsequent FPGA to run at exactly half the original clock speed (i.e. 78.125
MHz). The lower clock frequency reduces power consumption, ringing, jitter, and aids in meeting
tighter timing constraints. Therefore, every ethernet frame is broken into 128-bit (16-byte) blocks
and compared against the provided Snort signatures (also split into 16-byte blocks) until the entire
frame has been parsed.
Once the second FPGA has the two 128-bit words it can compare that data to various user-
defined Intrusion Detection/Prevention System (ID/PS) policies. These Snort rules may be either
static3 or dynamic4 and both types of rules are initially passed through a F10P custom lex/yacc rule
parser prior to uploading in order to ensure their syntactical “correctness”. The IPv4 packets are
either discarded or saved for later retrieval at the user’s discretion. Interesting (i.e. user-requested)
traffic flows may be off-loaded to the host memory for further inspection. This is accomplished
through the CPLD Peripheral Component Interconnect Extended (PCI-X) bus interface and Direct
Memory Access (DMA).
Figure 2.2 shows the F10P inspection process at a slightly higher level. Traffic enters the
transceivers (right) and the inbound/outbound processing channels determine whether the traffic is
allowed to pass.
3Static rule(s) may not be changed while the device is in operation.
4Dynamic rule(s) may be uploaded to the FPGA and be immediately effective in real-time while the device is filtering packets.
5Modified with permission from original image in [18]. The XAUI cores have been drawn outside of the XC2VP50 to increase
readability.
6Modified with permission from original image in [19].
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Figure 2.1: High-Level Block Diagram of P105
Figure 2.2: Logic Diagram of Traffic Flow in the P106
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2.2 Snort (Signatures)
Snort is an open-source, light-weight intrusion detection/prevention application that has two basic
operations: rule parsing and signature detection. The Snort rules are loaded into an internal data
structure when the Snort engine is loaded. This means that to add/remove any rules one must first
stop the Snort agent and reload it so that the new rules file may be parsed. A high-level view of the
signature detection process can be found in Figure 2.3.
The F10P has a distinct advantage here with the ability to dynamically load rules as mentioned
in section 2.1. The rules are split into two parts: the ‘header’ and the ‘option’. The header acts
as the expression/condition required to match a packet and may be used to specify the protocol,
source address, destination address, and port. For example [27], the rule header for the OpenSSH
CRC32 remote exploit is:
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 22
The ‘option’ for that same exploit would contain the signature itself and the rule’s priority:
(msg: ‘‘EXPLOIT ssh CRC32 overflow /bin/sh’’;
flow: to_server,established;
content: ‘‘/bin/sh’’; reference: bugtraq, 2347;
reference: cve, CVE-2001-0144;
classtype: shellcode-detect; sid:1324; rev:3;)
Figure 2.3: Signature Detection Process
2.3 Ourmon (Anomalies)
There are few well-known or reliable anomaly-based detection schemes available at the time of
this writing. Two of the more popular commercially available solutions for production networks
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are Symantec’s Manhunt™ and Lancope’s StealthWatch™. In the open-source arena there are even
fewer trusted algorithms, but one that has been proven to work over the last two years is “Ourmon”,
which was developed by Prof. Jim Binkley7, et al. [3].
The Ourmon algorithm suggests detecting botnet clients by labeling certain Internet Relay Chat
(IRC) channels as “evil channels” if the majority of the hosts within that channel are generating
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) SYN scans.8 The algorithm initially gathers the following
three sets of tuples over 30-second periods:
• TCP SYN Scanner Tuple
(IP source address, SYNS, SYNACKS,
FINSSENT, FINSBACK, RESETS,
PKTSSENT, PKTSBACK)
• Channel List Tuple
(CHANNAME, HITS, JOINS, PRIVMSGS,
NOIPS, IP LIST)
• Node List Tuple
(IPSRC, TOTALMSG, JOINS, PINGS, PONGS,
PRIVMSGS, CHANNELS, SERVERHITS, WW)
A subset of the full TCP SYN tuple data is taken based on hosts with an abnormally large
percentage of TCP control packets. The following metric, called the TCP “Work-Weight (WW)”,






• Ss = SYNs sent9
• Fs = FINs sent
• Rs = RSTs received
• Tsr = total TCP packets sent and received
In the worst case WW is 100% which would indicate a high probability that the host associated
with the given IP contains a scanner/worm attempting to propagate itself. On the other hand,
because of the manner in which the algorithm is calculated, a reliable WW value is affected by the
lack of connectivity present in emerging Peer-To-Peer (P2P) bot networks (see [15]). If there are
many of these hosts in a single IRC channel it likely indicates malicious activity. The remaining
items in the SYN tuple list aid in determining what exact exploit is being used.
A high-level view of the anomaly detection process can be found in Figure 2.4. Because this
algorithm is based on the characteristics of botnet communication (i.e. an unusually high number
of TCP control packets), it should not only prove useful in detecting bots that attempt to infiltrate
computer networks from the outside, but also bots that have infected a user’s machine at home (e.g.
via telecommuters) which automatically gain “insider” access.
7Prof. Binkley also co-authored [2].
8This section is directly adapted from [3]
9The SYN, FIN, and RST elements all consider the ACK flag as a “Don’t Care”.
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Figure 2.4: Anomaly Detection Process
2.4 Signatures vs. Anomalies
Signature and anomaly detection methods both have their advantages and disadvantages. When
comparing them, however, it becomes quite apparent that the two systems complement each other
extremely well.
Signature Advantages:
• Immediate detection is possible.
• User may be very specific with each rule.
• Smaller chance of false positives.
Signature Disadvantages:
• Zero-day attacks cannot be detected (since the signature is yet to be defined).
• Plain text rules files of old and new signatures may total 100 Megabytes (MB) or more in
size, and must be maintained in order to be effective.
• Very similar malicious bodies with slightly different signatures may be missed.10
• Encrypted payloads cannot be matched against known signatures.
Anomaly Advantages:
• Zero-day attacks can be detected.
10Many malicious applications, which already have signatures, will randomly modify themselves by only a few bytes in order to
avoid any known patterns. The “SpamThru” bot [28] is an excellent example of one of these self-modifying programs.
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• Similar entities can be detected.
• One algorithm can protect against numerous malicious bodies with minor changes11.
• Encrypted payloads are of no consequence if the algorithm is statistically based on the
packet headers.
Anomaly Disadvantages:
• Learning phase (must observe traffic for minimum period of time) results in slower
detection.
• User must be slightly more vague in their rule/algorithm.
• False positives are possible.
In order to provide adequate coverage, anomaly-based detection must be run in conjunction
with a signature-based mechanism. Therefore, the most obvious approach would be to run both
detection schemes simultaneously in hardware on the same device. The implementation of Snort
on the F10P does not require any modification, however, it lacks any inherent anomaly-based
agents.




In staying true to the anomaly-based detection paradigm, the author has designed a partial imple-
mentation of the full Ourmon algorithm. For this thesis the core WW algorithm (see Equation
2.1) was architected in hardware and not any of the three tuples described in section 2.3. Even
without the additional information provided by those three defined sets, this paper will show that a
hardware implementation of the WW algorithm alone has many distinct advantages.
This algorithm was implemented in hardware using the Verilog® Hardware Description Lan-
guage (HDL) and is run adjacent to the Snort implementation inside the second FPGA of the P10.1
By implementing the algorithm in hardware it was able to operate more efficiently by avoiding the
inherent disadvantages of a software-based approach while filtering the maximum traffic flow of
10 Gb/s.
3.1 Hardware Design Component
The API provided by the designers at F10 is not an actual “API” as most programmers would think
of one. The “API” is only a descriptive listing of the FPGA and Peripheral Component Interconnect
(PCI) bus signals located in the top-level design file. Available pre-defined “functions”, more
correctly referred to as logic blocks in this case, are limited to the PCI bus arbiter and the packet
pre-processor logic signals from the XC2VP50. A description for each of the major signals used
in the design may be found in Appendix A.
3.1.1 Packet Data Parsing
The most important of these signals are the 128-bit packet data signal and the offset signal from
the first FPGA. The data signal conveys the actual packet data from the physical fiber run to the
Snort and user logic blocks. Each 16-byte chunk is equal to one ‘offset’ signal count. As an
example, we have provided a textual rendition of what the first four ‘offsets’ of a TCP/IP Secure
Shell (SSH) destined packet would look like when entering the XC2VP702:
1The available resources in the XC2VP70 are considerable so there were no concerns regarding sufficient space for the design.
2Media Access Controller (MAC) addresses have been changed for security reasons.
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Preamble SFD DstMAC SrcMAC (2 bytes)
55555555555555 57 00DEADBEEFA2 01DE
Table 3.1: Packet Offset 0
SrcMAC EthType IPver Len TOS TotalLen ID Flags FragOff TTL Proto
ADBEEF30 0800 4 5 00 003C E3DA 0 000 3E 06
Table 3.2: Packet Offset 1
Checksum SrcIP DstIP SrcPrt DstPrt SeqNum
8ED8 03030302 02020203 D668 0016 BCEA
Table 3.3: Packet Offset 2
AckNum Offset Rsrvd Control Win CheckSum Urgent Option
CBAD 00000000 A 002 16D0 1905 0000 0204
Table 3.4: Packet Offset 3
Knowing these boundaries allows us to define the packet sections down to each individual bit.
The author has provided these bit definitions in Appendix B in hopes that they might be useful to
future F10P API users.
3.1.2 Floating-Point Unit Failure
The initial conceptual design for the WW algorithm involved storage of the resulting work-weight
percentage for each flow. In order for this to work the WW logic block would require a Floating
Point Unit (FPU) to perform the division operation. Xilinx provides customizable FPU and type-
casting cores for free with their CORE Generator™ (CoreGen) tool.
For the complete algorithm, the numerator and denominator must first be converted from inte-
ger to floating-point, then the division must be performed before the next packet is presented. To
ensure that no packets would be missed we first had to determine the worst-case number of clock
cycles that would be available for a packet. The following facts were taken into consideration:
• The offset signal increments once per 12.8ns clock cycle.
• The minimum Ethernet header length is 22 bytes (including Start of Frame Delimiter (SFD)
and Preamble).3,4
• The minimum IP header length is 20 bytes.
• The minimum TCP header length is 20 bytes.
• The TCP packet may have no payload bytes.
This leaves us with a worst-case count of 4 clock cycles in which to perform all of the afore-
mentioned operations. In order to accomplish that task the FPU required a latency (i.e. number
of clocks that must pass before the operand inputs may change) and cycles per operation (i.e. the
number of clocks that are required to produce a result) value of one clock cycle.
3Version 2.0 of the firmware will not include the SFD or Preamble resulting in one less clock cycle available for processing.
4The Preamble and SFD are used for Physical Layer Signaling (PLS) synchronization.
25
Unfortunately, even though the Xilinx CoreGen tool was capable of generating this single-clock
FPU, it was found that the 12.8ns timing constraint for the 78.125 MHz clock could not be met
during the Place and Route (PAR) phase.5 For sake of time the author chose not to research other
possible FPU implementations and abandoned the idea in search of a work-around. It was felt that
if the Xilinx PAR process could not meet the timing constraints for a Xilinx-designed FPU that
was fast enough to operate at the required clock rate then it was highly unlikely that a third-party
FPU would route either.
3.1.3 Flow Memory Data Storage
Even without an available FPU we will see that the speed-up provided by the hardware implemen-
tation has very little dependence on the division operation. The true efficiency increase lies in the
packet pre-processing phase of the implementation. This section will show that the host system
is only ever required to read a very small quantity of data from the Network Interface Card (NIC)
regardless of the total packet size or the amount of traffic flow. Most importantly, the host may
perform the read operations at its own leisure without affecting the algorithm calculation.
This is the underlying theory behind the entire design and why a hardware implementation will
function at 10 Gb/s and a software implementation will not. The dependency of the NIC on the
host system to keep up with the traffic has been reversed. We have “decoupled” the host<–>NIC
interface and made the host system dependent upon the NIC.
Because the FPU could not be implemented the design required memory space for four 32-bit
values instead of one. These values are listed below and the calculation block for each of them
may be found in the diagram in Figure 3.1. The partial numerator/denominator values used refer
back to the original WW algorithm defined in Equation 2.1.
• Partial “sent packets” numerator Ss +Fs.
• Partial “sent packets” denominator Ts.
• Partial “received packets” numerator Rr.
• Partial “received packets” denominator Tr.
Since the maximum possible count for each of these values is only 232 we have to consider if
that will be sufficient to provide meaningful data over a reasonable period of time. To do this we
calculate the worst-case maximum throughput (T Pmax) of a 10 Gb/s link as follows:
Facts
• Preamble = 7 bytes
• Start of Frame Delimiter (SFD) = 1 bytes
• Minimum Frame Length = 64 bytes
• Minimum Inter-Frame Gap (IFG) = 12 bytes







Therefore, if we assume the worst-case that every packet is a WW-countable TCP packet, then
the longest period of time for which any given flow can be tracked (i.e. the Maximum Flow Time)






Whether or not this flow lifetime is acceptable is highly dependent upon the network in which
the hardware is deployed. Again, five minutes is quite unrealistic as Sandia typically sees around
3.2 Gb/s on the Wide Area Network (WAN) links and approximately 5-7 Gb/s on local links and,
of course, not all of those frames will be countable by the algorithm. A much more likely scenario
would be around 15 minutes or more. According to Binkley’s original paper [3] five minutes
should be sufficient for generating meaningful data.
After selecting a reasonable data width for the flow memory, the theoretical maximum num-
ber of unique flows (T Fmax) that could be stored in the FPGA’s Block Random Access Memory
(BRAM)6 had to be determined. We calculate this as follows:
Facts
• The XC2VP70 has 328 BRAM blocks @ 18 Kb each = 5904 Kb = 738KB
• We must subtract 106 KB required for multipliers and other logic of the native P10 Snort rule
functionality.7
• Sixteen bytes of storage are required per flow.
Calculation - Theoretical
T Fmax =
(738 KB−106 KB)∗1024 bytes
16 bytes
= 40,448 flows
6An FPGA’s BRAM is similar in performance to the Level-2 (L2) cache found in most Central Processing Units (CPUs).
7The P10 would normally consume all of the BRAM space in the FPGAfor the packet capture buffer but this was deallocated to
make room for the flow memory.
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Calculation - Actual
The actual maximum number of simultaneous flows (AFmax) is 2n where n is the number of address
bits and 2n ≤ 40,448. Therefore, n = 15 and AFmax = 215 = 32,768 flows. The final flow data
memory was implemented in Verilog HDL as shown in the following excerpt from the Xilinx
synthesis report:
Synthesizing Unit <mtp_ourmon_flow_mem>.
Related source file is "mtp_ourmon_flow_mem.v".
Found 32768x32-bit dual-port block RAM for signal <mem>.
---------------------------------------------------------------
| mode | read-first | |
| dual mode | read-first | |
| aspect ratio | 32768-word x 32-bit | |
| clock | connected to signal <clk_A> | rise |
| dual clock | connected to signal <clk_B> | rise |
| write enable | connected to signal <write_A> | high |
| dual write enable | connected to signal <write_B> | high |
| address | connected to signal <addr_A> | |
| dual address | connected to signal <addr_B> | |
| data in | connected to signal <data_in_A> | |
| dual data in | connected to signal <data_in_B> | |
| data out | connected to signal <data_out_A> | |
| dual data out | connected to signal <data_out_B> | |





The inferred BRAM shown above was instantiated four times, two for the numerator and de-
nominator and two for each partial count.
3.1.4 Flow Hashing
Knowledge of the maximum number of flows that may be stored now requires a convenient method
of identifying unique flows and generating their respective addresses in memory. This portion
of the design is one of the most critical because the hash algorithm used must have a minimal
collision8 rate and not provide the user with erroneous information or false positives.
There are numerous research papers that identify reliable hashing algorithms for this very pur-
pose. Because of the extremely limited number of memory address bits available for each flow,
however, all but one was a viable option as a result of the extremely high collision rates they
yielded. The large majority of hash algorithms available use the same 4 or 5 IP packet fields:
• Type of Service (ToS)
• Source IP Address
8A collision occurs when two or more flows hash to the same storage location.
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• Source Port
• Destination IP Address
• Destination Port
A paper written by Zhiruo Cao, et al. [5] suggested the most attractive flow hashing solution,
which detailed what they called “XOR Five-Tuple Folding”. This method involves concatenating
all of the bits from each of the frame fields listed above and then XOR’ing each bit with its neighbor
down to the size of the memory address. For our design this generates the following terms:
• Cr = collision rate
• N = size of each hash table = 128KB
• m = max number of active flows = 32,760









This collision rate is quite appealing and could be considered for use in a production device.
However, it was ultimately decided that in order to prove this thesis the design would require a
collision rate of zero. No chance of collisions would allow the design to be completely verified by
matching packet counts for each flow against the traffic generator statistics.
The easiest and most logical manner in which to accomplish zero percent collision rate is to
generate the BRAM memory address solely from the outbound source IP address9. If we take the
least significant two octets we can use the 15 Least Significant Bits (LSBs) for the BRAM address.
We then use the Most Significant Bit (MSB), together with the processing channel selection signal,
for address decoding and memory block selection.
This still leaves us with collisions for any IP address over X.X.127.255 (i.e. 50% collision
rate), which is worse than with Zhiruo’s method. To compensate for this the author has coded the
verilog to check and see if the MSB of the last two octets is ‘1’ - if it is, the packet is ignored.
This allows the design to operate at full capacity with zero collisions for all 32K flows with the
restriction of being able to track only a 15-bit addressable network.
3.1.5 Multiple Clock Domains
Another requirement was that the 78.125 MHz design must be able to communicate with the 133
MHz PCI-X bus. The host system cannot read/write directly from/to any “ordinary” memory at
the same time as the FPGA, and it especially can’t do so at a different clock rate.
9Or the inbound destination IP address depending upon which direction the current packet is traveling.
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The solution for this dilemma has been around for many years. That solution is dual-ported
memory. If we review the inferred memory module report shown in section 3.1.3 the reader will
see that there are duplicate read, write, data, address and clock ports. One set of ports is for the
FPGAs usage and one set is for the host system. We can see this exact layout in the block diagram
shown in Figure 3.1. This allows each side to read/write to the flow memory at any time.
The only real caveat is that if one side reads and one side writes to the same address in the same
clock cycle the correct data will be written but incorrect data will be read. If this occurs the correct
data will be read on the next read from that location and will likely go unnoticed.
We must also consider the 156.25 MHz clock domain from the pre-processor FPGA. Fortu-
nately, this arbitration is already taken care of by the pre-existing F10 code.
3.1.6 Algorithm Instantiation
With the algorithm implementation complete, we may instantiate the design in the top-level design
file and synthesize it with the rest of the native hardware. This is where the “API” truly comes into
play. All of the required port mappings are shown below:
mtp_ourmon my_ourmon (
//Channel 0 and 1 common signals






























Appendix A contains a description of each signal. A block diagram of the final WW implemen-
tation can be seen in Figure 3.1. Additionally, a higher-level system view of the algorithm design
as it relates to the rest of the P10 hardware can be found in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.1: Hardware Design Block Diagram
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Figure 3.2: Completed Hybrid System
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3.2 Software Design Component
With the flow data being stored in the FPGA’s BRAM we need to determine how to retrieve the
data from the NIC using a custom application. F10 has provided the required functions that will
make this possible.
3.2.1 Retrieving the Work-Weight Data
The first step is to initialize the operating system so that it is aware of the NIC and its location in
system memory. This is accomplished with the os init() function which generates the Linux
file descriptors and defines the Base Address Registers (BARs). The BARs of all PCI devices are
what make “Plug and Play” possible.
In the past, Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) required users to physically alter jumpers on
the card to logically assign it a non-conflicting location in system memory. The BARs perform
the same function except they are dynamic registers stored on the card that are written to during
system boot.
With the Operating System (OS) initialization complete, we may now utilize the flow memory
on the NIC using the provided bar read * and bar write * functions. From the F10P docu-
mentation we know that any memory associated with processing channel 0 and processing channel
1 can be accessed at locations 0x100000 and 0x180000, respectively. Combining these ad-
dresses with our knowledge of the address decode of the flow memory, we can read the flow data
using custom C code as follows10:
for( i = 0; i < FLOW_MAX; i++ ) {
\\Fetch Ss+Fs
bar_read_dword( mtp_num, BRAM_CHAN0 + (i*4),
&flow_data[FLOW_TX][FLOW_NUMER][i] );
\\Fetch Ts
bar_read_dword( mtp_num, BRAM_CHAN0 + (FLOW_MAX*4) + (i*4),
&flow_data[FLOW_TX][FLOW_DENOM][i] );
\\Fetch Rr
bar_read_dword( mtp_num, BRAM_CHAN1 + (i*4),
&flow_data[FLOW_RX][FLOW_NUMER][i] );
\\Fetch Tr




• mtp num will always be ‘0’ for the P10.11
10Remember, we are reading 32-bit values, not bytes. Hence, the multiplication of the addresses by 4 was required.
11There is only one physical card in the unit.
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• BRAM CHAN0 = 0x100000
• BRAM CHAN1 = 0x180000
• FLOW MAX = 32768
• flow data is a reference to a three-dimensional flow data storage array.
3.2.2 Software Flow
Once the flow data has been collected the only limitations on information processing are those
inherent to the programming language and host sytem in use. The most important function in
the mtp ourmon.c file is the flow sort() function that sorts the retrieved flow data by the
maximum WW and expires each flow as its timeout is reached. The entire flow of the software
portion of the design can be seen in Figure 3.3. The entire flow is cycled once every second by
default.
The “Other User Option?” process reflects any of the other options listed in the Help menu
shown here:
• s: Start or restart the F10P drivers and reload the firmware.
• m: Manage rules, set capture/forward policies, select firmware.
• i: Number of seconds for the refresh interval.
• n: Set the network base address (for display purposes only).
• e: Erase a single flow.
• E: Erase all flows.
• j: Number of ourmon evil flows to show.
• k: Enter the ourmon flow timeout in minutes.
• w: Threshold percentage for Ourmon work-weight (WW).
• q: Quit the program.
• h: Display help menu.
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Figure 3.3: Software Design Flow Chart
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3.2.3 Textual User Interface
The application snapshot shown in the box on page 38 is a TUI that relies on the Ncurses API
for displaying information to the user. The F10 team wrote the entire framework and the majority
of the code that was used in this thesis. In other words, the author takes no credit for setting up
the TUI except for formatting the display of the Ourmon flow data. The user may notice that
the interface looks very similar to the Linux “top” application. In fact, the team at F10 directly
modified the top source code for their own use.
The top half of the TUI is data from the F10P’s 29 native statistics stored in a part of the
XC2VP70 that is separate from the WW algorithm flow data. Descriptions for each of these statis-
tics is not available in the F10 documentation, but the author has provided a description of each of
these statistics in Appendix C since it might be useful to future API users.
The interface shows a variety of traffic flows that were generated with the Adtech AX/4000.
The network base address of 134.253.X.X shown in the image only affects the display and does
not change the storage of the flow data in any way.
Closer inspection of the screenshot will reveal flows with a WW value above the user-defined
40% threshold. This causes the application to alert the user with an “Anomalous flow detected!”
message. The threshold is set arbitrarily by the user dependent upon the network traffic and may
be changed at any time. Future uses of this feature could cause an alert e-mail to be sent or a log
to be recorded.
The most important concept to recognize here is that no longer is the hardware determining
the state of the CPU (i.e. with interrupts). Instead, the software is now arbitrarily fetching only
the exact data it needs and only when it needs it. The host is no longer being controlled, it is the
controller.
The “Exp” column is the flow timeout value. The flow timeout counts down from a user-
specified value for each flow. The flow is erased from the FPGA’s BRAM using the bar write dword
function when its lifetime has expired.
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Cpu(s): 34.0% user, 0.2% system, 0.0% nice, 65.9% idle
Dev: 0 - Type: MTP-70 - Firmware: 0 - v143 - ffsts ky - irq/s: 0
eth2 UP DMA=on FlowTimeout=16 Pkts/flow=0 Trunc=0 IRQ period=5ms
Hardware Interfaces CH0 Top Pkts/s CH1 Bottom Pkts/s
Total Packets 1092334315 0 2474247313 0
TCP Packets 1095068828 0 2474247217 0
UDP Packets 0 0 0 0
ICMP Packets 0 0 0 0
Other Packets 5 0 96 0
Matched Packets 0 0 0 0
Total Flows 0 0 0 0
Delayed Packets 0 0 0 0
Stateful Packets 0 0 0 0
Blocked Packets 0 0 0 0
Alert! Anomolous flow detected!
Top 7 Evil Flows for Network 134.253.X.X Above 40.000% Threshold
Flow# X . X Ss+Fs Ts Rr Tr WW Exp
1 123.015 ..927 ..328 ..930 ..881 87% 473
2 123.004 ..013 ..560 ..464 ..345 74% 2034
3 123.016 ..842 ..280 ..784 ..663 62% 102
4 123.011 ..530 ..602 ..620 ..877 58% 2543
5 123.014 ..380 ..759 ..797 ..260 55% 80
6 123.018 ..134 ..709 ..993 ..082 48% 1085
7 123.009 ..284 ..607 ..524 ..127 41% 1243




This chapter will describe in some detail the experimental steps that were used in validating the
results of this research. The author’s original method of attack in testing the design was to use
actual bots in testing. However, for sake of time and safety of Sandia’s production network no real
bots were used. It is important to note that the lack of real bots in this analysis in no way affect the
validity of the functionality tests. The following items should provide sufficient justification for
these deviations from “real” network testing:
• The purpose of this thesis was not to prove that the WW algorithm itself can detect actual
bots. This has already been shown by Binkley, et al. over the last two years. This research
was performed to show that an implementation of the algorithm in hardware would be more
effective than a software approach when analyzing a 10 Gb/s data stream.
• The native Snort rule matching capability of the F10P has already been proven in the field
and is a production device available to the general public.
• The operation of the hardware implemented code can be validated with packet count match-
ing between the F10 device and the AX/4000 traffic generator statistics.
Even though a true internet connection would quite likely provide the author’s network with
numerous malicious applications, the results and attacks would not be repeatable. This project
required a repeatable experiment in order to achieve meaningful outcomes. The AX/4000 traffic
generator [6] was used to simulate the WAN and fill the inbound and outbound pipes of the P10
to their theoretical maximums.1 This is the only way to statistically prove the effectiveness of a
hardware driven IPS system over similar software-only methods.
4.1 Network Setup
As stated in section 1.1 many software-based IPS models are inefficient since they lack visibility of
the network. The vast majority of these applications cannot handle the immense traffic flow found
1It is important to note that, while some legitimate hosts were used in preliminary testing, simulated host IP addresses generated
with the AX/4000 device were found to be just as useful in the final analysis.
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on large network backbones. The P10, however, was designed with this very purpose in mind.
4.1.1 Hardware Implemented Ourmon Testing
For the hardware implementation test the P10 was connected to a private network consisting of a
core router, a distribution layer switch, secure monitoring devices, simulated hosts, and a simulated
WAN connection. There was no firewall or any other security measures implemented between the
internet and the hosts aside from the F10P containing the WW algorithm. Table 4.1 shows the
hardware and software resources that were used in implementing the network diagram shown in
Figure 4.1.
Hardware Exact Version Used
P10 IPS Gentoo Linux 2.6.17.13 SMP
2x Intel® Xeon™ 2.80GHz Firmware v1.4.3
2GB RAM
Spirent® AX/4000 Traffic Generator Network Access GUI v4.71
2x 10 Gb/s Blades
Table 4.1: Network Resources (Hardware Test)
The hardware-based test cases were performed in the following order:
1. The P10 was enabled as a pass-through device with no Snort rules or WW algorithm acti-
vated.
2. The AX/4000 inbound and outbound blade statistics were checked to ensure no packet loss
had occurred.
3. The P10 native packet statistics were checked to ensure they matched the packets counts
shown on the AX/4000.
4. The P10 hardware-based WW algorithm was enabled.
5. The AX/4000 inbound and outbound blade statistics were checked to ensure no packet loss
had occurred.
6. The P10 native packet statistics were checked to ensure they matched the packets counts
shown on the AX/4000.
7. The hardware-based WW algorithm packet counts were checked to ensure they matched
those of the AX/4000.
8. The above steps were repeated at the following traffic throughput intervals: 1 Gb/s, 5 Gb/s,
7 Gb/s, 10 Gb/s.
9. The above steps were repeated again, but with the added challenge of tracking simultaneous
TCP/IP flows.
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Figure 4.1: Hardware Implemented Ourmon Test Network
4.1.2 Software Implemented Ourmon Testing
For the software-based implementation of the algorithm the author chose the best hardware that
was readily available. Table 4.2 shows the hardware and software resources that were used in
implementing the network diagram shown in Figure 4.2. Please reference section 4.2 for more
information on why no outbound traffic channel is shown in the network and why no test cases are
provided.
Hardware Exact Version Used
2x x86 64 AMD Opteron™ 252 2.6GHz Gentoo Linux 2.6.20 SMP
2GB RAM tcpdump v3.9.5-r3
Myricom 10 Gb/s 8x PCI-E NIC libpcap v0.9.5
Spirent® AX/4000 Traffic Generator Network Access GUI v4.71
2x 10 Gb/s Blades
Table 4.2: Network Resources (Software Test)
4.2 Success Criteria
The success of this thesis was based on the following three criteria2, which were decided upon by
the author, the committee members, and Richard Hu at SNL.
2All three test criteria were performed with the native P10 Snort rule logic in place and processing packets at line rate.
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Figure 4.2: Software Implemented Ourmon Test Network
4.2.1 Criteria 1 - Can the hardware implementation capture and calculate the work-weight
algorithm at data rates beyond those possible via a software implementation?
Hardware Test
In testing the implemented hardware design with the experiment setup described in section 4.1.1
the author has verified that all packets were captured and that the WW was successfully calculated
for simultaneous traffic flows up to full-duplex 10 Gb/s operation.3 This test
Software Test
Unfortunately, for the software experiment setup described in section 4.1.2, the host machine was
unable to successfully capture all packets at full 10 Gb/s capacity even with a single inbound-only
traffic flow. The test was setup using tcpdump compiled with the libpcap memory-mapped,
ring-buffer modification from Phil Wood [35] at Los Alamos National Laboratories (LANL).
In utilizing the host packet buffer modification the author still observed 25%-30% packet loss
on average at 10 Gb/s flow using the AX/4000. Clearly, with reasonable hardware, and enhance-
ments to the libpcap library, a software implementation is unable to meet the first half of this
criteria let alone calculate an algorithm in real-time. Therefore, we can conclude that a software im-
plementation of any algorithm at 10 Gb/s is not only intractable it is also infeasible with presently
available hardware.
4.2.2 Criteria 2 - Can the joint operation of the F10P’s inherent signature-based detection
scheme with the additional anomaly-based detection identify more malware than the
original F10P without the anomaly-based mechanism?
For this test condition the following assumptions were made:
• The ability of the F10P to match signature Snort signatures at 10 Gb/s was not affected by
the implementation of the WW algorithm and has remained intact. This is safe to assume for
two reasons: the WW logic block is physically and logically separate from the factory Snort
implementation and all original timing constraints were met for the design.
3The traffic generated for both the hardware and software experiments was worst-case scenario with every packet being a valid
(i.e. WW-countable) TCP packet.
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• We may also then assume the converse of the previous item in that the entire WW algorithm
is not affected by the F10P native Snort rule matching capability. If there were conflicts the
WW algorithm would not function properly, which contradicts section 4.2.1.
• Disabling of the BRAM packet buffer used for capturing capabilities does not affect the
F10P’s capacity to block or allow packets based on the defined rule set. The author has
confirmed with the chief architect of the original P10 design, Livio Ricciulli, that this is the
case.
With the items listed above and the success described in section 4.2.1 established we can say
that the hybrid signature/anomaly implementation successfully functions at a full-duplex 10 Gb/s
capacity. Referring back to the general knowledge presented in section 2.4 we can conclude that
this success criteria has been met.
4.2.3 Criteria 3 - Does a live demonstration of the design match the results portrayed in this
document?
The live demonstration of the entire hardware and software design was presented to the committee
observer, Larry F. Tolendino, on July 6, 2007 on-site at SNL. A live demonstration of the device to
all committee members during the thesis defense was not possible as the device in question could
not be removed from the labs for reasons of national security.
Please refer to the itemized listing of the design validation criteria presented in Appendix sec-




The hybrid anomaly/signature IPS design presented in this paper not only has the numerous advan-
tages as described in the previous chapters, but also has many practical applications for production
networks. This section will discuss possible security implementations for the device as it directly
relates to the SNL networks.
5.1 Security and Visibility
Over the next few years Sandia intends to incrementally upgrade its Energy Sciences Network
(ESnet) WAN connection and backbone from its current 100Mbps link to 10 Gb/s. This bandwidth
increase will improve support for PetaScale computation. Figure 5.1 shows a high-level diagram
of what the Sandia SNL/New Mexico (NM) network might look like by the year 2010. The image
was originally provided by the committee observer, Lawrence F. Tolendino, and then modified by
the author to include the Force10 P-Series.
A 10 Gb/s connection introduces many questions, including:
1. How do we monitor 10 Gb/s traffic?
2. How do we secure a 10 Gb/s link from malicious activity?
The P10 can answer both of these questions in tandem. The P10 has both traffic dump capa-
bility to the host and, with the research presented in this thesis, can also perform signature and
anomaly detection at line rate. This allows the device to be placed directly in line with the back-
bone link without any packet loss whatsoever. Additionally, new rules and algorithm updates may
be uploaded to the XC2VP70 on the fly without disrupting traffic throughput, which is critical
for production networks. During these system modifications, however, all traffic (malicious or
otherwise) is passed through the F10P device unabated.
44
Figure 5.1: 2010 SNL/NM WAN ESnet and ASC WAN Configuration
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5.2 Limitations
Even though the implementation described in section 5.1 may look appealing, care should be taken
in understanding the limitations of the device prior to permanent deployment. We describe some
of these limitations below:
• Less than adequate documentation with multiple syntactical errors. The author has corrected
some errors in the documentation and has been informed that the changes will be imple-
mented by F10 in future revisions.
• Limited technical support for the API. The only person available to help the author with the
API during his research was the chief architect. Some questions would require weeks for any
response. Additionally, the API examples will not compile properly without code fixes that
were made by the author.
• The F10P is an “active” device, not “passive”, meaning that if power fails to the box all
traffic will be blocked. In order for the device to be fully effective is must be configured in
the network as an inline module. If the user does not wish to use the full security capabilities
of the device it is possible to install the device on a mirror/Switched Port Analyzer (SPAN)
port.
• The number of usable Snort rules in the F10P is directly proportional to the size of the FPGA.
Fortunately, as FPGAs reduce in price the hardware may be upgraded in future revisions. We
are essentially sacrificing speed for rule capacity.1
• The F10P does support every type of Snort rule construct available. The F10 documentation
[19] specifically states which options are available. The F10P custom lex/yacc rule parser
mentioned in section 2.1 will also inform the user of invalid rule types.
• The author has found that the 10 Gb/s packet dump capability of the P10 to the host OS is
limited and does not always present all packets or present the packets in the correct sequence.
F10 has knowledge of this issue, but it is unknown if they intend to release a fix.
• At the time of this writing, no Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) support is available for 10
Gb/s model of the F10P.





Botnets are an extremly effective means of gaining unauthorized access into protected systems.
Unlike viruses, botnets can easily circumvent signature detection schemes. Only when we join
signature detection and behavioral analysis can we defend against this malware.
In this paper we have presented a hybrid method of performing both anomaly and signature
detection in one network security device. Not only can this model out-perform all software-based
implementations to date, it can also run at 10 Gb/s line rate. This design can increase productivity
and prevent data theft by combining two field proven network security paradigms.
The future of the F10P API is uncertain and the documentation and examples still require more
work. Aside from the steep learning curve, the 10 Gb/s capability is available and waiting for novel
architectural uses. It is hoped that this paper will help other owners of the F10P in developing their
own algorithms and possibly sharing them with the rest of the world.
Cyber security is its own microcosm of research venues that requires the cumulative efforts
of the entire community in order to be successful. Regardless of the tools at our disposal, there
has yet to be any electronic device that can substitute for the human mind. The most efficient





There is room for improvement in every design and the design presented in this paper is no ex-
ception. Even though this proof-of-concept architecture has worked very well it leaves much to be
desired.
Software Updates
One of the major limitations of the hardware implementation is the small 32-bit packet count space
for flow data. This limitation could very easily be overcome with a bit of work to the TUI appli-
cation discussed in section 3.2. The program could be modified to store flow history data in the
systems main memory and account for past packet counts when calculating the WW percentage.
This would effectively result in limitless packet count availability which would consequently in-
crease the flow expiration time to infinity.
IPv6 Efforts
Many corporate networks and the United States (U.S.) government are making the move to Internet
Protocol version 6 (IPv6) (including SNL). Therefore, having IPv6 security capabilities at 10 Gb/s
rates will be a necessity. F10 currently has Snort rule support for the Force10 P-Series (1 Gb/s)
(P1) only, not the P10, however, support is expected to arrive in the near future. The WW algorithm
could adapt to the massive 128-bit IPv6 address space with an adequate flow hashing algorithm.
Proactive Network Management
Not only could this box be used on a production network, but it could also be used to proactively
monitor the types of malware that are attempting to infiltrate a network using what are called
“Honeynets”. Deploying this design in a non-critical system removes the inherent danger that lost
power to the device might compromise the production network backbone because of the active
(rather than passive) nature of the F10P. The user can monitor their honeynet to see what types of
malware are likely to appear on the corporate network in the future and proactively mitigate the se-
curity hole. The interested reader can find out more about Honeynets at http://www.honeynet.org/.
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Network Device Integration
When F10 purchased the MetaNetworks company their original idea was to incorporate the 10 Gb/s
Snort rule matching capability into their router Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs).
However, SNL has yet to see this availability in any of the F10 equipment. Integration of the TUI
into their routers would increase the accessibility and usability of the security features since they
could be easily managed directly through the router’s Command Line Interface (CLI).
Algorithm Enhancements
As previously mentioned in section 2.4, the unique advantage of anomaly-based detection is that
slight modifications to an algorithm may detect more/newer malware. This is unlike the Snort rules
where new signatures that occupy much of the FPGAs logic capacity. For example, the hardware
implementation of the WW algorithm could be easily modified with one or more of the following
elements1:
• Surround the logic with various “if/then/else” decision rules to improve and/or alter how it
works. For example, we could check to see if the IP source address is only sending packets
and never receives any packets back.
• Consider how the algorithm functions over multiple samples (e.g. P2P using systems have
high work weights at times but the work weight can be lowered with a weighted history
function like the TCP Round Trip Time (RTT) algorithm.
• Disregard all received TCP packets to a source node and divide by either the total TCP
packets or just the packets received.
• Store flow data based on individual networks instead of individual IPs. This would consume
less BRAM and possibly allow for storage of a flow timeout value.
• Allow user to specify the WW threshold in a hardware register and then block any packets2
that match to that “evil” flow. With upgraded FPGAs and an FPU this enhancement would
be possible.
Storage Capacity Upgrades
As mentioned in section 5.2, the Snort rule and WW flow data storage size is directly proportional
to the size of the FPGA. As FPGAs become cheaper and larger, we could increase the number of
simultaneous flows to a full 216 class B address space, improve the packet capture buffer, store
more Snort rules, and so on.
With newer FPGAs also comes enhanced performance. A faster FPGA (e.g. the Virtex-4)
would quite likley have ample PAR area to allow for implementation of the FPU. An FPU would
provide the capability of storing only one single 4-byte word for every flow rather than 16 bytes.
F10 has mentioned that they are working on new hardware for their next version of the P10.
1Some suggestions paraphrase those provided by Prof. Jim Binkley (jrb A T cs.pdx.edu). Website: http://web.cecs.pdx.edu/ jrb/






The F10P API is logically split into two different interfaces - the Data interface and the Control
interface. Some of the major signals used in the algorithm implementation are described below.1
The reader should use this information at their own risk.
A.1 Data Interface
The programmer can utilize the Data interface signals to process incoming packets at wire speed
and direct the capture and forwarding policies. The Dynamic Parallel Inspection (DPI) core offers
the captured packets to the host through a PCI-X master DMA implementation that can yield
throughputs of up to 1 Gb/s for large packets and 1.1 Mbps for small packets.
A.1.1 Input Signals
• pkt new - goes high to indicate a new packet is being received. The signal is a pulse
indicating the start of a packet.
• pkt clk - this is the XC2VP70 78.125 MHz clock generated from the XC2VP50 156.25
MHz clock
• pkt valid - (active high) - asserts that pkt data is valid. When the signal is logic low
the computation on the packet must assume that the values in the “pkt data” signal are not
valid. This signal can be de-asserted at any time during packet reception. This signal rarely
goes low and for most intents and purposes the architect should never have to worry about
it going low. The only time it is sure to be low is between packets and for any packets
that contain Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) content (e.g. Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) packets that have % signs).
1This section was adapted from the limited descriptions provided in the F10 documentation. Most of these signals have been
updated with the author’s interpretations based on experience.
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• pkt data - 128-bit (16-bit for P1) - represents packet data @ “pkt offset”. The data is
arranged with the most-significant byte representing the first byte received. When destined
to port 80 the URI data is normalized to remove encodings. The P10 uses a 128-bit bus rather
than 16-bit in order to be functional at 10 Gb/s.
• pkt data next - 128-bit (16-bit for P1) - represents packet data @ “pkt offset+1”. Allows
for a single clock “look ahead” if packet data is needed earlier or more operational clocks are
needed between frames.
• pkt offset - 11-bit - represents which segment (i.e. word) of current packet is being
clocked in. This signal changes once per “pkt clk” cycle. Note that the word size of the
P10 is 128 bits. The entire Ethernet frame is presented including the 7-byte preamble (i.e.
0x55555555555555) and a 1-byte “Start of Frame” delimiter (i.e. 0x57). The last two bits
of the SFD are both ’1’s in order for the Media Access Controller (MAC) to know where the
actual packet data is going to begin. For the P10, this means that the first Ethernet destination
address byte is the 9th byte at pkt offset 0. Remember, when data is sent across a network
it is sent in the following order: raw data from the application, segment, packet, frame, and
finally, the bits on the wire. The pkt offset value can range from 0 to 2047. Since each
pkt offset is 16 bytes in size this allows for a maximum ethernet frame size of 32768 bytes.
The actual theoretical maximum for an ethernet frame is 65536 bytes, but a frame greater
than 32768 bytes is so unlikely that it’s not even considered. The reader may refer to section
3.1 for an example of the packet offsets.
• inpacketoff - 8-bit - represents byte offset from first payload byte. It can be used in con-
junction with the “pkt offset” signal to determine when the packet header has been processed
by the system. At reset (before and during header processing) this signal has a value of 0x1A.
Note that this is a constant value and does not change over time once its value has been de-
termined (it says at what point the payload data starts). This is unlike the “pkt offset” signal
which changes as the packet is being processed. For instance, assume an Ethernet frame with
a 7-byte preamble, 1-byte Start of Frame Delimiter (SFD), 6-byte destination MAC, 6-byte
source MAC, and a 2-byte EtherType value (for a total of a 22 byte frame header) is entering
the P10. Once the frame header has been processed, the inpacketoff signal value will change
from 0x1A to 0x16 (or 22 - remember count starts from byte number 0) since the offset of
the first payload byte is the 23rd byte. The value will remain 0x16 until the next ethernet
frame, at which point the value will temporarily return to 0x1A until the next ethernet frame
header has been parsed.
• dsize - 12-bit - represents size (in bytes) of payload. This signal becomes valid after the
header is processed. At reset (before and during header processing) this signal is 0xFFFF.
This signal has the potential of being 16 bits wide for future scalability for super jumbo
frames of 65536 bytes. But as of now it will never be larger than 12 bits.
• cin - 16-bit - represents state information of packet flow being received. This value becomes
valid after the header is processed. At reset (before and during header processing) this signal
assumes the value 0x0.
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A.1.2 Output Signals
• Matchresult - indicates that system should capture the packet and provide it to the host
through the PCI bus. It can be asserted any time during packet reception. Again, packets are
sent to the host through a PCI-X master DMA implementation (the hardware for which is
stored on the onboard CPLD).
• R - indicates that system should store packet in temporary match memory. Multiple packets
can be subsequently stored. Packets belonging to the same flow are stored as a linked list.
These packets will not be provided to the host unless a subsequent packet within the same
flow asserts the “F” signal before a timeout.
• F - has same effect as “Matchresult” but, in addition, allows linking the packet currently being
matched with other packets previously matched with the “R” signal. As a result, the host will
receive this packet through the PCI bus as the last packet of a list of packets previously stored
in temporary match memory (through the “R” signal).
• B - blocks packet forwarding. It can be asserted any time during the packet reception and can
be asserted orthogonally to the “Matchresult”, “R”, and “F” signals.
• C - 16-bit - state vector to be stored for flow represented by the current packet. This value
is written to Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) at the end of the packet reception and
will be presented as “Cin” (in data interface) to future packets of the same flow. This signal
could be renamed “Cout” - the counterpart to “Cin”.
• Notfmatch - indicates to system that a match was negated as a result of a pass rule. This
information is relevant for decreasing the global flow counter (i.e. a global parameter limiting
the number of packets captured for each flow). Even when a packet is not stored through
the “R” or “F” signals, when “notfmatch” spikes the global flow counter is decremented
regardless.
• Rulenum - 32-bit - to be stored as trailing data to packet. It is transferred to the host with
the captured packets and is available to the PCI driver on the host. The driver currently
ignores this value; but it could be use to convey the context of a match. In other words, it
could signify which rule caused the packet to be sent to the host. In most cases, the architect
only needs to know that a rule fired and not which one matched. The api test.v file and the
auto-generated cam files define this signal as 12 bits, but the documentation states that it is
supposed to be 32 bits. Livio says that this signal will never be larger than 12 bits.
A.2 Control Interface
The Control Interface is used to communicate register or memory values to/from the host. Con-
trol storage is accessed through Memory-Mapped I/O (MMIO). The control data is transferred
through a PCI-X target rather than a PCI DMA. The maximum throughput for this interface is
approximately 1 Mb/s, which is more than adequate.
A.2.1 Input Signals
• pci clk - the 133 MHz PCI-X clock.
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• pci init - asserted when the P10 is reset.
• pci prog - asserted whenever there is a valid address to be read/written in the user-defined
configuration registers.
• pci addr - 18-bit - address of register or memory being accessed by the host.
• pci data in - 32-bit - data to be written to the registers or memory.
A.2.2 Output Signals
• pci data out - 32-bit - data read from registers or memory to the host.
• magic (read-only) - 32-bit - provided to host for management purposes (typically used to
identify what module is being run).
• modeval - 32-bit - Read by the OS to determine which capabilities were chosen during
firmware compile time (i.e. during the getparams.sh script execution).
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APPENDIX B
Packet Data Bit Definitions
The following bit definitions represent bit/byte offsets for most TCP/IP packets as they enter the
second FPGA. The reader should use this information at their own risk.
Packet sections Legend:
ETH = Ethernet Frame Header
IP4 = IPv4 Header
TCP = TCP Header
Description Bit Vector # bytes
ETH PREAMBLE 127:72 7 bytes
ETH SFD 71:64 1 byte
ETH MAC DST 63:16 6 bytes
ETH MAC SRC 1 15:0 2 bytes
Table B.1: Offset 0 Bit Definitions
Description Bit Vector # bytes
ETH MAC SRC 0 127:96 4 bytes
ETH TYPE 95:80 2 bytes
IP4 VER 79:76 4 bits
IP4 IHL 75:72 4 bits
IP4 TOS 71:64 1 byte
IP4 TOT LNGTH 63:48 2 bytes
IP4 ID 47:32 2 bytes
IP4 FLAGS 31:29 3 bits
IP4 FRAG OFF 28:16 13 bits
IP4 TTL 15:8 1 byte
IP4 PROTO 7:0 1 byte
Table B.2: Offset 1 Bit Definitions
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Description Bit Vector # bytes
IP4 CHECKSUM 127:112 2 bytes
IP4 ADDR SRC 111:80 4 bytes
IP4 ADDR DST 79:48 4 bytes
TCP PORT SRC 47:32 2 bytes
TCP PORT DST 31:16 2 bytes
TCP SEQ NUM 1 15:0 2 bytes
Table B.3: Offset 2 Bit Definitions
Description Bit Vector # bytes
TCP SEQ NUM 0 127:96 2 bytes
TCP ACK NUM 111:80 4 bytes
TCP OFFSET 79:76 4 bits
TCP RSRVD 75:73 3 bits
TCP ECN 72:70 3 bits
TCP FLAGS 69:64 6 bits
TCP WINDOW 63:48 2 bytes
TCP CHECKSUM 47:32 2 bytes
TCP URG PTR 31:16 2 bytes




These descriptions are a compilation of the author’s experience and input provided by F10. Any
numbers enclosed in brackets ‘[]’ indicate bit numbers. The reader should use this information at
their own risk.
• 00 = Control (see below)
• 00[0] - Card Enable - Enables the cams
• 00[1] - Misc Control
• 00[2] - Enable Interrupt
• 00[3] - DMA Enable
• 00[4] - Misc Control
• 00[5] - Congestion Control Channel 0
• 00[6] - Congestion Control Channel 1
• 00[7] - Misc Control
• 00[8] - Secret Control
• 00[9] - Misc Control
• 01 = If DMA is enabled this is the last Central Processing Unit (CPU) write address for
Channel 0, otherwise it’s the FPGA buffer memory address
• 02 = If DMA is enabled this is the last CPU write address for Channel 1, otherwise it’s the
FPGA buffer memory address
• 03 = Front end status
• 04 = Secret
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• 05 = These firmware labels are created when the user’s firmware is compiled (see below).
• 05[31:16] = Firmware Revision (e.g. 143)
• 05[0] = ”stt” - static rules
• 05[1] = ”ffsts” - flow history
• 05[2] = ”dny” - dynamic rules with states
• 05[3] = ”ky” - dynamic rules with offsets
• 06 = magic0 - cam rev?
• 07 = FPGA buffer change address Channel 0
• 08 = FPGA buffer change address Channel 1
• 09 = Blocked Packets Channel 0
• 10 = Total Packets Channel 0
• 11 = TCP Packets Channel 0
• 12 = User Datagram Protocol (UDP) Packets Channel 0
• 13 = Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Packets Channel 0
• 14 = Other Packets Channel 0
• 15 = Matched Packets Channel 0
• 16 = Total Flows Channel 0
• 17 = Delayed Packets Channel 0
• 18 = Stateful Packets Channel 0
• 19 = Blocked Packets Channel 1
• 20 = Total Packets Channel 1
• 21 = TCP Packets Channel 1
• 22 = UDP Packets Channel 1
• 23 = ICMP Packets Channel 1
• 24 = Other Packets Channel 1
• 25 = Matched Packets Channel 1
• 26 = Total Flows Channel 1
• 27 = Delayed Packets Channel 1
• 28 = Stateful Packets Channel 1
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• 29 = Reserved
• 30 = Reserved
• 31 = Reserved
59
APPENDIX D
10 Gb/s Interface Structure
The diagrams shown in this section will not be discussed in any detail as they are beyond the scope
of this paper. The images were modified from [4, 9, 12, 18, 19, 23–25]. The author takes absolutely
no credit for any of these diagrams except for the color coding, short notations, and collection one
common place of reference. The modifications are correct to the best of the author’s knowledge,
but should be used at the reader’s own risk.1
The acronyms used in the images are as follows:
• Double Data Rate (DDR)
• Logical Link Controller (LLC)
• Media Access Controller (MAC)
• Media Dependent Interface (MDI)
• Physical Coding Sublayer (PCS)
• Physical Media Attachment (PMA)
• Physical Media Dependent (PMD)
• Reconciliation Sublayer (RS)
• WAN Interface Sublayer (WIS)
• 10 Gb/s Attachment Unit Interface (XAUI)
• 10 Gb/s Media Independent Interface (XGMII)
• XGMII Extender Sublayer (XGXS)
• 10 Gb/s Sixteen-Bit Interface (XSBI)
1Some of the image annotations may be specific to the F10P only and not true for all 10 Gb/s interfaces in general
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Figure D.1: 10 Gb/s Interface Structure Model
Figure D.2: 10 Gb/s Interface Structure Block Diagram Level 1
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Figure D.3: 10 Gb/s Interface Structure Block Diagram Level 2
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Below the reader will find a list of the various architectural elements that were tested and verified
during the official on-site demonstration of the author’s thesis. Each component was chosen and
agreed upon by the author and the committee observer.
1. Hardware “tour” and matching network diagram.
2. Algorithm tracks multiple flows based on IP address.
3. Algorithm processes all packets at 10 Gb/s line rate.
4. User can erase a single flow from the hardware memory.
5. User can erase all flows from the hardware memory.
6. Flows are erased based on user-defined timeout.
7. Each flow is automatically sorted based on work-weight.
8. Help menu available.
9. Application can be exited and re-run to see same flow data (shows flow data is stored in
hardware and not in application memory).
10. Flows disappear and reappear based on user-defined threshold.
11. User can change number of flows displayed.
12. Brief overview of hardware/software code.
13. Error-free implementation of hardware.
14. Error-free compilation of software.




Please note that this is a listing of the major source code files only and is by no means exhaustive.
All configuration files for the routers, switches, Adtech AX/4000, servers, hosts, etc. can be found
on the CD that was originally submitted with this thesis or from the author’s website [10].
F.1 Hardware (Verilog HDL)
• top2.v - Top-level design file.
• meta (0|1).mapping - Defines which rules go to which processing channel.
• mtp config* - Configuration files used to define F10P dynamic features.
• mtp ourmon.v - WW calculation logic block.
• mtp ourmon flow mem.v - Dual-ported memory module for WW flow data.
• mtp port cnt (0|1).v - Port counter module used in initial API and design testing.
• fpga.10G.ucf - Top-level User Constraints File (UCF).
F.2 Software (C Code)
• float2hex.c - Used to verify proper operation of FPU.
• hex2float.c - Used to verify proper operation of FPU.
• mtp ourmon.c - TUI used to display flow data to the user.
• mtp portcnt.c - TUI used to display port count data to the user.
• os dep.h - PCI bar (read|write) * function definitions.
• osinit.c - Used to initialize the OS for F10P interfacing.
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• pci.c - PCI communication controller.
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